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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 10-1817 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
 
v. 
 
WILLIAM FRAZIER 
 a/k/a Rich Moore 
 
WILLIAM FRAZIER, 
                              Appellant 
____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE 
(D.C. Crim. No. 99-cr-00007-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joseph J. Farnan, Jr. 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 17, 2011 
____________ 
 
Before: BARRY, CHAGARES and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: March 24, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
William Frazier was convicted in July 1999 of two counts of distributing cocaine 
 2 
base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and (b)(1)(B).  He presently is 
serving two consecutive life terms.  The District Court denied Frazier’s motion, pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), to reduce his sentence based on the retroactive amendment of 
sentencing guidelines which lowered base offense levels for certain quantities of crack 
cocaine.  See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amends. 706 & 713.  Frazier appeals.  We will affirm. 
I.  Background 
Writing primarily for the parties, and because two of our cases have squarely 
addressed and resolved the issue that Frazier presents, our discussion will be brief.   
Frazier’s conviction stemmed from two sales to a D.E.A. informant, eight days 
apart, of crack cocaine weighing 32.5 and 53.5 grams.  The District Court sentenced him 
to two consecutive life terms because he had two prior felony drug convictions, and the 
government had sought enhanced mandatory minimum sentencing and career offender 
classification.  See 21 U.S.C. § 851; U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.  His conviction pursuant to § 841 
(b)(1)(A) prescribed a life sentence, while both § 841(b)(1)(B) and his career offender 
status—with an offense level of 37 and a criminal history category of VI—permitted one. 
In September 2008, Frazier filed a pro se motion for sentence reduction pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  Counsel later filed a similar motion, and in March 2010 the 
District Court denied both motions, noting that Frazier’s sentence turned on his career 
offender classification and on a statutory mandatory minimum term of life imprisonment.  
On appeal, it is undisputed that in light of United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 
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2009), and United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2009), the Court properly held 
that Frazier’s argument for sentencing reduction fails.  Frazier, however, is pursuing this 
appeal to preserve his right to petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 
II.  Standard of Review and Discussion 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We review de novo a district court’s 
interpretation of the Guidelines.”  Mateo, 560 F.3d at 154 (citation omitted).  Although a 
district court’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) is subject to plenary review, Doe, 
564 F.3d at 307 n.2, we “review a court’s ultimate decision whether to grant or deny a 
defendant’s motion to reduce sentence under § 3582(c)(2) for abuse of discretion.”  
Mateo, 560 F.3d at 154 (reference omitted). 
 Mateo and Doe compel the resolution that we reach here.  Mateo held that the 
revision of the crack cocaine guidelines is irrelevant where, as here, an appellant’s 
sentence reflects not the applicability of offense-specific guidelines—such as those for 
crack—but, rather, the applicability of the career offender provision of § 4B1.1, which 
trumps an otherwise-applicable offense level where the latter is lower than that provided 
for by § 4B1.1.  560 F.3d at 154-55; see also United States v. Flemming, 617 F.3d 252, 
257 (3d Cir. 2010) (“a career offender, who received no downward departures and was 
sentenced within the Career Offender Guidelines range, [i]s not eligible for a reduction in 
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sentence even though his base offense level under the Crack Cocaine Guidelines had been 
subsequently lowered by Amendment 706.”).  Because “Amendment 706 does not affect 
[Frazier’s] applicable sentencing range, … § 3582(c)(2) does not authorize a reduction in 
his sentence.”  Mateo, 560 F.3d at 155.   
 Likewise, where a mandatory minimum sentence, such as appears in the enhanced 
penalty provision of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(A), “subsume[s] and displace[s an] … initial 
Guideline range[],” such a sentence is “not affected by Amendment 706.”  Doe, 564 F.3d 
at 312.  Given Frazier’s prior record, the second count of conviction statutorily mandated 
a life sentence, which is not displaced by the revised crack cocaine guidelines. 
III.  Conclusion 
 Mateo and Doe were correctly applied in this case.  The fact that Frazier is 
imprisoned for life for selling crack cocaine in amounts that can carry less severe 
punishment now than when he was convicted may give one pause, but 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c) permits the modification of a sentence only in very limited circumstances, not 
present here.
1
  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                                 
1
 A defendant in Frazier’s position would not today receive a mandatory life sentence, 
because the present version of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) mandates life imprisonment for 
offenders with two or more prior felony drug convictions whose triggering offense 
involves 280 or more grams of crack.  The count of conviction in Frazier’s case charged 
under § 841(b)(1)(A) involved 53.5 grams of crack.  Thus, under current law, both of 
Frazier’s sales would be governed by § 841(b)(1)(B).  However, not only does this not 
implicate a possible modification under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), but where a defendant has 
two prior felony drug convictions, selling crack in quantities such as Frazier did—
whether considered when he was convicted, or now—would permit a sentencing court to 
impose life imprisonment under § 841(b)(1)(B). 
